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From Minority Game to Black&Scholes pricing
Matteo Ortisi∗, Valerio Zuccolo†
Abstract
In this paper we study the continuum time dynamics of a stock in a market where
agents behavior is modeled by a Minority Game and a Grand Canonical Minority
Game. The dynamics derived is a generalized geometric Brownian motion; from the
Black&Scholes formula the calibration of both the Minority Game and the Grand
Canonical Minority Game, by means of their characteristic parameters, is performed.
We conclude that for both games the asymmetric phase with characteristic parameters
close to critical ones is coherent with options implied volatility market.
Key words: Minority Game, Grand Canonical Minority Game, Agent-based mod-
els, Option pricing, Market calibration.
1 Introduction
In recent years researchers endeavored to build models that reproduce some empirical
statistical regularities of the real financial markets, such as volatility clusters, fat tails,
scaling, occurrence of crashes, etc., known as “stylized facts” (see [11, 13, 15]). One
possible way to address this problem is the “black-box” stochastic approach. A complex
stochastic process which possesses the relevant characteristics of the desired empirical facts
is constructed. Processes used in this kind of models are nonlinear diffusion models, Le´vy
processes, jump processes and stochastic volatility models. Another possibility is to follow
the agent-based framework, which models the market and derives from the interaction
between players the stock price dynamics. Herd behavior and Minority Game are examples
of these models. Choosing between these two models families relies on the purpose of the
modeling itself. “Black-box” stochastic modeling is used in financial mathematics, where
the main goal is practical use, i.e. the pricing of derivatives or portfolio allocation. Agent-
based models are mainly used in economics where the theoretical aspects, the explanation
and understanding of financial markets, are the main intent.
There is a complementarity between these two approaches; indeed “black-box” stochas-
tic models lack of explanatory power by construction and agent-based models can be hardly
used for pricing purposes given their complexity. Moreover one of most attractive features
of the usual Black&Scholes type models is the possibility of obtaining closed, exact for-
mulas for the pricing of financial derivative securities. Such qualities are fundamental
from the point of view of finance practitioners, like financial institutions, that require
fast calculations, closed pricing formula for calibration purposes and tools to hedge risky
assets.
A very promising way to combine these main issues, is to focus on highly simplified
toy models of financial markets relying on the Minority Game (MG) [4]. Variants of this
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model, like the GCMG, have been shown to reproduce quite accurately such stylized facts
of financial markets (see [1, 3, 6, 12, 20]) and moreover the continuum time limit of the
MG and the GCMG provides a bridge between the adherence to empirically observed
features of real markets and the practical usability of “black-box” stochastic models, since
its evolution follows a system of stochastic differential equations (see [16], [9]).
In this framework, the stock price process is driven by the excess demand or overall
market bid. The excess demand evolution process for real and “fake” market histories
has been explicitly obtained in [9]. While a game with real market histories can fit stock
prices better than a game with “fake” ones, the latter is more mathematically tractable,
especially if the purpose is to obtain closed formulas and not run the game through sim-
ulations. Models with “fake” market histories, where at each point in time all agents are
given random rather than real market data upon which to base their decisions, have the
advantage of being Markovian and hence suitable to the application of classic results, like
Girsanov theorem, that are at the hearth of option pricing techniques in mathematical
finance. On the other side, models with real market histories are strongly non-Markovian
and a dynamics simple like (3) is no more available. The dependence of the process on the
history makes meaningless all the averages present in equation (3); the evolution process
becomes a system of stochastic differential equations whose parameters are to be obtained
as a solution of a dynamic system defining the bid evolution process (see [9] for details).
Since our aim is to calibrate the MG and the GCMG on the real market of European call
options, as a first attempt to obtain a closed formula for pricing an European call option
on a single stock it is easier, and maybe compulsory, to use the simplest version of these
games with “fake” market histories and to recover the excess demand directly from the
scores difference stochastic differential equations obtained in [5, 16]. Using this approach
it is possible to apply the usual “change of measure technique”, that guarantee the absence
of arbitrage in the model and the existence of the hedging portfolio, and hence to obtain
closed pricing formulas allowing the model calibration to the market. Undoubtedly the
MG with real market history must be investigated and the approach used in [9] must be
kept in mind for further development.
The work is organized as follow. In Section 2 the classical MG and GCMG models and
their continuum time limit versions are described. In Section 3 we derive the stock price
dynamics and in Section 4, by using the classical risk-neutral pricing techniques (see [19]),
we apply the Black&Scholes formula to price European options. Section 5 contains the
process to calibrate the MG and the GCMG on the European options market for several
sets of game and option parameters.
2 The Models
In this section the basic concept and the main results of MG and GCMG useful for our
purposes will be exposed (for a comprehensive introduction to MG and GCMG refer to
[7, 10]).
2.1 Minority Game
Here we are considering a slightly modified version of the MG, where there are N agents
and its dynamics is defined in terms of dynamical variables Us,i(t), scores corresponding
to each of the possible agents strategy choices s = +w,−w. This version of the game with
non-unitary weights has already been studied in [3].
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Each agent takes a decision (strategy choice) si(t) with
Prob{si(t) = s} = e
ΓiUs,i(t)∑
s′ e
ΓiUs′,i(t)
where Γi > 0, and s
′ ∈ {−w,+w}. The original MG corresponds to Γi = ∞ and was
generalized to Γi = Γ <∞ [2]; here we consider the latter case.
The public information variable µ(t), that represent the common knowledge of the past
record, is given to all agents; it belongs to the set of integers {1, . . . , P} and can either
be the binary encoding of last M winning choices or drawn at random from a uniform
distribution:
Prob{µ(t) = µ} = 1
P
, µ = 1, . . . , P.
Here we consider the latter case (see [2]).
The strategies aµs,i are uniform random variables taking values ±w (Prob{aµs,i = ±w} =
1/2) independent on i, s and µ. Here we consider S = 2, i.e. 2 strategy for each agent
that are randomly drawn at the beginning of the game and kept fixed.
On the basis of the outcome B(t) =
∑N
i=1 a
µ(t)
si(t),i
each agent update his scores according
to
Us,i(t+ δt) = Us,i(t)− aµ(t)s,i
B(t)
P
, (1)
where δt→ 0 is the time increment.
Let us introduce the following random variables (to ease the notation the choices +w
and −w are shorted with + and −)
ξµi =
aµ+,i − aµ−,i
2
, Θµ =
N∑
i=1
aµ+,i + a
µ
−,i
2
and their averages
ξiΘ =
1
P
P∑
µ=1
ξµi Θ
µ, ξiξj =
1
P
P∑
µ=1
ξµi ξ
µ
j .
The only relevant quantity in the dynamics is the difference between the scores of the two
strategies:
yi(t) = Γ
U+,i(τ)− U−,i(τ)
2
, (2)
where τ = tΓ .
Let (Ω,F ,P) be the probability space respect to which all our random variables are
defined, y = (yi)1≤i≤N , Θ = (Θµ)1≤µ≤P and ξ = (ξi)1≤i≤N .
As shown in [16], if P/N = α ∈ R+, S = 2 and Γi = Γ > 0 for all i, the dynamics of
the continuum time limit of the MG is given by the following N -dimensional stochastic
differential equation
dyi(t) =
−ξiΘ− N∑
j=1
ξiξj tanh(yj(t))
 dt+Ai(α,N,Γ, ξ)dW(t), i = 1, . . . , N (3)
where
W(t) is an N -dimensional Wiener process,
3
Ai is the i-th row of the N ×N matrix A = (Aij) such that
(AA′)ij(α,N,Γ, ξ) =
Γσ2Nw
2
αN
ξiξj,
σ2N =
1
w2
〈B2〉 = 1
Pw2
∑P
µ=1
〈
B2|µ〉.
The relevant feature for our purposes is its limit behavior, as N grows to infinity, with
respect to α: for α ≥ αc, limN→∞ σ
2
N
(y)
N
≤ 1, ∀y, while for α < αc, limN→∞ σ
2
N
N2
≤ k, with
k constant (see figure 1, left). For more details see [10].
2.2 Grand Canonical Minority Game
The second market model we are going to analyze in this work is the GCMG (for more
details see [5]). In this game each agent has only one trading strategy a
µ(t)
i = ±w randomly
chosen from the set of 2P possible strategies. Each agent may decide not to play if
the strategy is not good enough. More precisely, following the same formalism used to
introduce the MG, each agent takes a bid bi(t) = φi(t)a
µ(t)
i where φi(t) = 1 or 0 according
to whether agent i trades or not.
On the basis of the outcome B(t) =
∑N
i=1 bi(t) =
∑N
i=1 φi(t)a
µ(t)
i each agent update
his scores according to
Ui(t+ δt) = Ui(t)− aµ(t)i
B(t)
P
− ǫi
P
, (4)
where δt→ 0 is the time increment.
If −aµ(t)i B(t) is larger than ǫi, the score Ui increases. The larger Ui the more likely it
is that the agent trades (φi(t) = 1). Here we assume
Prob{φi(t) = 1} = 1
1 + eΓUi(t)
,
with Γ > 0.
The threshold ǫi models the incentives of agents for trading in the market; investors
interested in trading because they need the market for exchanging assets have ǫi < 0
whilst speculators trading for profiting of price fluctuations have ǫi > 0. We will focus,
for simplicity, on the case
ǫi = ǫ > 0 for i ≤ Ns
ǫi = −∞ for Ns < i ≤ N.
The Np = N−Ns agents with ǫi = −∞ are the producers trading no matter what, whereas
Ns are the speculators trades only if the cumulated performance of their active strategies
increases more rapidly than ǫt,
From equation (4) and (5) in [5] the dynamics of the continuum time limit of the
GCMG is given by the following N -dimensional stochastic differential equation
dyi(t) =
− N∑
j=1
aibjH(yj(t))− ǫ
 dt+Ai(α,N,Γ, a, b)dW(t), i = 1, . . . , N (5)
where
4
yi(t) = ΓUi(τ), τ =
t
Γ ,
W(t) is an N -dimensional Wiener process,
Ai is the i-th row of the N ×N matrix A = (Aij) such that
(AA′)ij(α,N,Γ, a, b) =
Γσ2N
P
aiaj =
Γσ2Nw
2(ns + np)
N
aiaj ,
σ2N =
1
w2
〈B2〉 = 1
Pw2
∑P
µ=1
〈
B2|µ〉,
H is the generalized Heaviside function (Prob{φi(t) = 0, 1} = H(yi(t))),
(. . .) stands for average over µ(t).
The relevant features of σ2N for our purposes are in the thermodynamic limit, which
is defined as the limit Ns, Np, P → ∞, keeping constant the fraction of speculators and
producers ns =
Ns
P
and np =
Np
P
. In this case the rule of key parameter α in the MG is
played by αns :=
1
ns+np
. The transition phase is marked by a critical value of speculators
αcns(P ): for αns ≥ αcns(P ), limN→∞ σ
2
n
N
(y) ≤ 1 ∀y, for αns < αcns(P ), limN→∞ σ
2
n
N2
(y) ≤
k ∀y (see figure 1, right).
A key aspect that characterize the GCMG is that as soon as ǫ > 0 it is no more possible
to find a solution for Hǫ = 0, where Hǫ is the predictability function. Like it happens
in the financial markets where ǫ, sum of interest rate and transaction costs, represents
incompressible costs, in the GCMG the onset of unpredictability corresponds to minima
of Hǫ: as the fraction of speculators ns increases (and hence the system size increases) the
minimum of volatility σ2N decreases and the market becomes more and more unpredictable
(see [5]).
3 Stock price dynamics
In this section, using the scores difference stochastic differential equations, the overall
market bid and hence the stock price dynamics is derived.
Let us consider a single stock in a market modeled by the continuum time MG or
the continuum time GCMG; following [6], we define the stock price dynamics in terms of
excess demand, as
log p(t+ δt) = log p(t) +
B(t)
Nw
(6)
(Nw is the volume of trades and w can be seen as the inverse liquidity parameter).
In the GCMG we are allowed to divide B(t) not by the number of active traders Nact ,
but by the total number of agents N because we are interested in results as N → ∞ in
the thermodynamic limit, where Np →∞ and Ns →∞; hence as N grows to infinity also
the number of active traders grows to infinity of the same degree.
We address the analysis of the stock price dynamics for the MG and the GCMG
separately.
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3.1 MG case
Our aim is to obtain the continuum time dynamics of the stock price p(t) from the con-
tinuum time dynamics of y(t) defined by (2). The key point is the following identity, that
can be obtained directly from (1)
U+,i(t+ δt) − U−,i(t+ δt)
2
=
U+,i(t)− U−,i(t)
2
− a
µ(t)
+,i − aµ(t)−,i
2
B(t)
P
.
Taking into account relation (2) and that Γ is finite, we obtain
yi(Γt)
Γ
− yi(Γ(t+ δt))
Γ
= −ξµ(t)i
B(t)
αN
.
In the continuum time limit δt→ 0,
dyi(Γt) = −Γξµ(t)i
B(t)
αN
, ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (7)
Dynamics (7) reflects the stock price dynamics (6), where B(t)
N
is the generator of log p(t);
indeed, like the right hand side of (6), also the right hand side of (7) does not contain a
dt term and −Γξµ(t)i B(t)αN is the generator of yi(Γt).
Multiplying both sides of (7) by ξ
µ(t)
i , averaging over all the agents i, and taking the
limit as N goes to infinity we have
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
ξ
µ(t)
i dyi(Γt) = −
Γ
α
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
ξ
µ(t)
i
)2 B(t)
N
.
Since the ξ
µ(t)
i are independent from B(t) (the difference between two actions given the
past history µ(t) is fixed at the beginning of the game and does not depend on the action
chosen by the agent on the basis of the score function Us,i(t)),
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
ξ
µ(t)
i
)2 B(t)
N
= E
[(
ξ
µ(t)
i
)2]
lim
N→∞
B(t)
N
=
w2
2
wd log p(t);
it follows that
d log p(t) = − 2α
w3Γ
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
ξ
µ(t)
i dyi(Γt). (8)
Integrating over [0, t] both sides of (8) and taking into account equation (3), it follows that
p(t) = p(0) exp
 limN→∞
∫ t
0
2α
w3N
N∑
i=1
ξµ(s)i
ξiΘ+ N∑
j=1
ξiξj tanh(yj(Γs))
 ds
− lim
N→∞
∫ t
0
2α
w3NΓ
N∑
i=1
(
ξ
µ(s)
i Ai
)
dW(Γs)
}
. (9)
The following proposition on the drift and diffusion term of equation (9) holds:
Proposition 3.1 Let t = O(N), that is limN→+∞ tN = k. The drift term of (9) is at
most O(N); the diffusion term is different from zero ∀α, finite for α ≥ αc and at most
O(N) for α < αc.
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Proof
It is easy to see that, by applying the Law of Large Numbers, ∀i limN→∞ ξ2i = w
2
2 ,
limN→∞ ξiξj = 0 and limN→∞ ξiΘ = 0 (for detailed computations see [18]); it follows that
lim
N→∞
2α
w3N
N∑
i=1
ξµ(s)i
ξiΘ+ N∑
j=1
ξiξj tanh(yj(Γs))
 = α
w3
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
ξ
µ(s)
i tanh(yi(Γs)) < kα,
with k finite constant. Hence the drift term is at most kαN and, due to different initial
conditions and the stochastic evolution of yi, in general different from zero.
Consider the zero mean random variable
Y =
∫ t
0
2α
w3NΓ
N∑
i=1
(
ξ
µ(s)
i Ai
)
dW(Γs);
since
2α
w3NΓ
N∑
i=1
(
ξ
µ(s)
i Ai
)
dW(Γs) =
N∑
j=1
(
2α
w3NΓ
N∑
i=1
ξ
µ(s)
i Aij
)
dWj(Γs),
Y has variance
ν =
∫ t
0
N∑
j=1
(
2α
w3NΓ
N∑
i=1
ξ
µ(s)
i Aij
)2
d(Γs)
=
∫ t
0
4α2
w6N2Γ
N∑
i=1
(
ξ
µ(s)
i
)2
(AA′)iids+
∫ t
0
4α2
w6N2Γ
N∑
i,j=1,i 6=j
ξ
µ(s)
i ξ
µ(s)
j (AA
′)ijds.(10)
AsN grows to infinity, by applying the Law of Large Numbers, limN→∞AA′ = limN→∞
Γσ2
N
w2
2αN I,
where I is the identity N ×N matrix (see [18] for details), and the first term of the right
hand side of (10) is equal to limN→∞
ασ2
N
t
w2N2
, while the second one is equal to 0. Since for
α ≥ αc, 0 < σ
2
N
N
< 1 and for α < αc, 0 <
σ2N
N
< kN , the thesis follows.

It is of worth to note that the hypothesis t = O(N) is necessary to have the diffusion
term different from zero and that it is the proportionality factor of the time needed to
reach the stationary state of the MG. In numerical terms it means that, given a maturity
t, a higher number of player needs a higher number of time steps, i.e. the player must
interact more times to reach an equilibrium.
Consider the dynamics
q(t) = p(0) exp

∫ t
0
2α
w3N
N∑
i=1
ξµ(s)i
ξiΘ+ N∑
j=1
ξiξj tanh(yj(Γs))
 ds
−
∫ t
0
2α
w3NΓ
N∑
i=1
(
ξ
µ(s)
i Ai
)
dW(Γs)
}
;
by definition q(t) converges pointwise towards p(t) (limN→∞ q(t) = p(t), ∀ω ∈ Ω) and
hence almost surely; it follows that a.s. ∀ǫ0 > 0 there exists N > 0 such that, ∀N > N ,
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|p(t) − q(t)| < ǫ0. By assuming t = kN and N finite but sufficiently large, we have that
a.s. q(t) ∼ p(t) and proposition (3.1) holds for q(t).
From now on we assume t = kN and N finite but sufficiently large to have
p(t) = p(0) exp

∫ t
0
2α
w3N
N∑
i=1
ξµ(s)i
ξiΘ+ N∑
j=1
ξiξj tanh(yj(Γs))
 ds
−
∫ t
0
2α
w3NΓ
N∑
i=1
(
ξ
µ(s)
i Ai
)
dW(Γs)
}
. (11)
Let us define Gt = σ(W (Γs), ξµ(s); s ≤ t) the filtration generated by both the processes
W and ξ. Since the drift and the diffusion terms are just the exponential of the drift and
the diffusion of equation (3) multiplied by ξ
µ(s)
i , they are adapted to the filtration Gt.
The differential of the stock price process is therefore, by Ito’s formula,
dp(t)
p(t)
=
 2α
w3N
N∑
i=1
ξ
µ(t)
i
ξiΘ+ N∑
j=1
ξiξj tanh(yj(Γt))

+
2α2
Γw6N2
(
N∑
i=1
ξ
µ(t)
i Ai
)(
N∑
i=1
ξ
µ(t)
i Ai
)′ dt− 2α
w3NΓ
N∑
i=1
(
ξ
µ(t)
i Ai
)
dW(Γt)
=
 2α
w3N
N∑
i=1
ξ
µ(t)
i
ξiΘ+ N∑
j=1
ξiξj tanh(yj(Γt))
+ 2α2
w6ΓN2
N∑
j=1
(
N∑
i=1
ξ
µ(t)
i Aij
)2 dt
− 2α
w3NΓ
N∑
i=1
(
ξ
µ(t)
i Ai
)
dW(Γt).
3.2 GCMG case
For the case on the GCMG, since yi(t) = ΓUi(τ), it is immediate to see that for δt→ 0
dyi(Γt) = − Γ
P
(
a
µ(t)
i B(t)− ǫi
)
= −Γ(ns + np)
N
(
a
µ(t)
i B(t)− ǫi
)
, ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (12)
Multiplying both sides of (12) by a
µ(t)
i , averaging over all the agents i, and taking the
limit as N goes to infinity we have
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
a
µ(t)
i dyi(Γt) = −Γ(ns+np) lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
a
µ(t)
i
)2 B(t)
N
+Γ(ns+np) lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
ai(t)
ǫi
N
.
Since a
µ(t)
i have zero mean
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
ai(t)
ǫi
N
= lim
Ns→∞
1
Ns
Ns∑
i=1
ai(t)
ǫ
N
+ lim
Np→∞
1
Np
N∑
i=Ns+1
ai(t)
(−∞)
N
= 0
and are independent from B(t),
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
a
µ(t)
i
)2 B(t)
N
= E
[(
a
µ(t)
i
)2]
lim
N→∞
B(t)
N
= w3d log p(t);
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it follows that
d log p(t) = − 1
w3Γ(ns + np)
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
a
µ(t)
i dyi(Γt). (13)
Since ns + np =
N
P
= 1
α
, we can put 1
ns+np
= αns (np is itself a function of ns). αns as
the same role of α in the MG, but whilst in the MG np = 0 and hence α depends only on
speculators, in the GCMG ns is the fundamental quantity driving the behavior of σ
2
N .
Integrating over [0, t] both sides of (13) and taking into account equation (5), it follows
that
p(t) = p(0) exp
 limN→∞
∫ t
0
αns
w3N
N∑
i=1
a
µ(s)
i
 N∑
j=1
aibjH(yj(Γs))
 ds
− lim
N→∞
∫ t
0
αns
w3NΓ
N∑
i=1
(
a
µ(s)
i Ai
)
dW(Γs)
}
. (14)
Proposition 3.1 holds also for (14); the drift term is essentially the same of (9) and since
in the GCMG limN→∞AA′ = limN→∞
Γσ2Nw
2
αnsN
I proceeding in the same way we did for
proving proposition 3.1 we conclude that the diffusion term is different from 0, finite for
ns ≤ ncs(P ) and at most O(N) for ns > ncs(P ).
Also in this case we have that assuming t = kN and N finite but sufficiently large
p(t) = p(0) exp

∫ t
0
αns
w3N
N∑
i=1
a
µ(s)
i
 N∑
j=1
aibjH(yj(Γs))
 ds
−
∫ t
0
αns
w3NΓ
N∑
i=1
(
a
µ(s)
i Ai
)
dW(Γs)
}
. (15)
Let us define Gt = σ(W (Γs), aµ(s); s ≤ t) the filtration generated by both the processes
W and a. Since the drift and the diffusion terms are just the exponential of the drift and
the diffusion of equation (5) multiplied by a
µ(s)
i , they are adapted to the filtration Gt.
The differential of the stock price process is therefore, by Ito’s formula,
dp(t)
p(t)
=
 αns
w3N
N∑
i=1
a
µ(t)
i
 N∑
j=1
aibjH(yj(Γt))

+
α2ns
Γw6N2
(
N∑
i=1
a
µ(t)
i Ai
)(
N∑
i=1
a
µ(t)
i Ai
)′ dt− αns
w3NΓ
N∑
i=1
(
a
µ(t)
i Ai
)
dW(Γt)
=
 αns
w3N
N∑
i=1
a
µ(t)
i
 N∑
j=1
aibjH(yj(Γt))
+ α2ns
w6ΓN2
N∑
j=1
(
N∑
i=1
a
µ(t)
i Aij
)2 dt
− αns
w3NΓ
N∑
i=1
(
a
µ(t)
i Ai
)
dW(Γt).
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4 Derivative security pricing
In this section we develop the risk-neutral pricing of a derivative security on a single stock
whose price dynamics is given by (11) and (15). We follow the usual scheme: construction
of the risk-neutral measure, relying on Girsanov Theorem, for the discounted process and,
by using the Martingale Representation Theorem, of the replication portfolio that allows
to hedge a short position in the derivative security (see [19], p. 209-220). At the end of
the section we apply Black&Scholes formula to price a European call option.
4.1 Discounted stock dynamics under risk-neutral: MG case
Consider the interest rate process R(s) adapted to the filtration Gt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T . The dis-
count process D(t) = e−
∫ t
0
R(s)ds has, by Ito’s formula, differential dD(t) = −R(t)D(t)dt.
The discounted stock process is
D(t)p(t) = p(0) exp

∫ t
0
−R(s) + 2α
w3N
N∑
i=1
ξµ(s)i
ξiΘ+ N∑
j=1
ξiξj tanh(yj(Γs))
 ds
−
∫ t
0
2α
w3NΓ
N∑
i=1
(
ξ
µ(s)
i Ai
)
dW(Γs)
}
,
and its differential
d(D(t)p(t))
D(t)p(t)
=
 2α
w3N
N∑
i=1
ξµ(s)i
ξiΘ+ N∑
j=1
ξiξj tanh(yj(Γs))

+
2α2
w6ΓN2
N∑
j=1
(
N∑
i=1
ξ
µ(t)
i Aij
)2
−R(t)
 dt− 2α
w3NΓ
N∑
i=1
(
ξ
µ(t)
i Ai
)
dW(Γt).
Proposition 4.1 If T = O(N) there exists a probability measure P˜ (risk neutral measure)
under which the discounted stock price D(t)p(t) is a P˜-martingale.
Proof
Let us define the market price of risk equation to be
2α
w3NΓ
N∑
i=1
(
ξ
µ(s)
i Ai
)
γ(Γt) =
 2α
w3N
N∑
i=1
ξµ(s)i
ξiΘ+ N∑
j=1
ξiξj tanh(yj(Γs))
 +
+
2α2
w6ΓN2
N∑
j=1
(
N∑
i=1
ξ
µ(t)
i Aij
)2
−R(t)
 ,
where γ(Γt) = (γ1(Γt), . . . , γN (Γt)) is an unknown process; the differential of the dis-
counted process becomes
d(D(t)p(t)) = D(t)p(t)
2α
w3NΓ
N∑
i=1
(
ξ
µ(s)
i Ai
)
[γ(Γt)dt− dW(Γt)].
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Let ||·|| denote the usual Euclidean norm; we show that for T = O(N), ∫ T0 ||γ(Γu)||2d(Γu) <
∞. Consider N finite and sufficiently large (we remind that proposition (3.1) for N finite
and sufficiently large); since, by proposition (3.1)
∫ T
0
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ 2αw3NΓ
N∑
i=1
(
ξ
µ(u)
i Ai
)∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
2
d(Γu) =
∫ T
0
N∑
j=1
(
2α
w3NΓ
N∑
i=1
ξ
µ(u)
i Aij
)2
d(Γu) > 0 and finite,
∫ T
0
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 2αw3N
N∑
i=1
ξµ(s)i
ξiΘ+ N∑
j=1
ξiξj tanh(yj(Γs))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
d(Γu) <∞,
and ∫ T
0
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 2α
2
w6ΓN2
N∑
j=1
(
N∑
i=1
ξ
µ(t)
i Aij
)2∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
d(Γu) ∼ 0,
we have
0 <
∫ T
0
||γ(Γu)||2 d(Γu) <∞.
It follows that γ(Γt) satisfies the Novikov condition (see [17])
E
[
1
2
∫ T
0
||γ(Γu)||2du
]
<∞.
As a consequence we can apply Girsanov’s Theorem (see [14], p.198); there exists a prob-
ability measure P˜ (risk neutral measure) under which W˜(Γt) =
∫ t
0 γ(Γu)du−W(Γt) is an
N -dimensional Brownian motion. It follows that
d(D(t)p(t)) = D(t)p(t)
2α
w3NΓ
N∑
i=1
(
ξ
µ(t)
i Ai
)
dW˜(Γt),
and hence the discounted stock price is a P˜-martingale.

By making the replacement dW (Γt) = γ(Γt)dt− dW˜ (Γt), dynamics (11) of the undis-
counted stock price p(t) becomes
p(t) = p(0) exp

∫ t
0
R(s)− 2α
2
w6ΓN2
N∑
j=1
(
N∑
i=1
ξ
µ(t)
i Aij
)2
ds+
∫ t
0
2α
w3NΓ
N∑
i=1
(
ξ
µ(s)
i Ai
)
dW˜(Γs)
}
. (16)
4.2 Discounted stock dynamics under risk-neutral: GCMG case
Consider the interest rate process R(s) adapted to the filtration Gt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T . The dis-
count process D(t) = e−
∫ t
0 R(s)ds has, by Ito’s formula, differential dD(t) = −R(t)D(t)dt.
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The discounted stock process is
D(t)p(t) = p(0) exp

∫ t
0
−R(s) + αns
w3N
N∑
i=1
a
µ(s)
i
 N∑
j=1
aibjH(yj(Γs))
 ds
−
∫ t
0
αns
w3NΓ
N∑
i=1
(
a
µ(s)
i Ai
)
dW(Γs)
}
,
and its differential
d(D(t)p(t))
D(t)p(t)
=
 αns
w3N
N∑
i=1
a
µ(s)
i
 N∑
j=1
aibjH(yj(Γs))

+
α2ns
w6ΓN2
N∑
j=1
(
N∑
i=1
a
µ(t)
i Aij
)2
−R(t)
 dt− αns
w3NΓ
N∑
i=1
(
a
µ(t)
i Ai
)
dW(Γt).
With the natural modifications to the market price of risk equation in proposition 4.1,
the same proposition holds also for the GCMG and dynamics (15) of the undiscounted
stock price p(t) becomes
p(t) = p(0) exp

∫ t
0
R(s)− α
2
ns
w6ΓN2
N∑
j=1
(
N∑
i=1
a
µ(s)
i Aij
)2
ds+
∫ t
0
αns
w3NΓ
N∑
i=1
(
a
µ(s)
i Ai
)
dW˜(Γs)
}
. (17)
4.3 European call option pricing
Since, for T − t = O(N), there exists a risk neutral measure P˜ for the discounted process
D(t)p(t), we can apply the usual scheme, relying on the martingale representation theorem,
to show the existence of a replication portfolio for a derivative security pricing.
Consider T − t = O(N); let V (T ) be an GT -measurable random variable representing
the payoff at time T of a derivative security. The process E(t) = E
P˜
[D(T )V (T )|Gt] is
a P˜-martingale (it follows from iterated conditioning); by the Martingale Representation
Theorem there exists an initial capitalX(0) and a portfolio strategy ∆(t) such thatX(T ) =
V (T ) almost surely and an adapted process φ(t) which constructs E(t) out of D(t)p(t). It
follows that D(t)X(t) is a P˜-martingale
D(t)X(t) = E
P˜
[D(T )X(T )|Gt] = EP˜[D(T )V (T )|Gt]. (18)
The value X(t) of the hedging portfolio in (18) is the capital needed at time t in order to
successfully hedge the position in the derivative security with payoff V (T ). Hence V (t) is
the price of the derivative security at time t and we obtain the usual risk neutral pricing
formula (see [19], p.218-222)
D(t)V (t) = E
P˜
[D(T )V (T )|Gt], 0 ≤ t ≤ T ;
by recalling the definition of D(t),
V (t) = E
P˜
[e−
∫ T
t
R(s)dsV (T )|Gt], 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
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Proposition 4.2 Let us assume constant interest rate r; the price of a European call
option with underlying p(t) and strike K is
c(t, p(t);K, r, ν) = p(t)ψ(d(θ, p(t))) − e−rθKψ
(
d (θ, p(t))−√ν
√
θ
)
,
where θ = T − t, ν = νMG = ασ
2
N
w2N2
for the MG, ν = νGCMG =
αnsσ
2
N
w2N2
for the GCMG,
d(θ, p(t)) =
[
log
p(t)
K
+(r+ 12ν)θ
]
√
νθ
and ψ the erf function.
Proof
Consider the random variable
Y =
∫ T
t
2α
w3NΓ
N∑
i=1
(
ξ
µ(s)
i Ai
)
dW˜(Γs) =
N∑
j=1
∫ T
t
2α
w3NΓ
N∑
i=1
(
ξ
µ(s)
i Aij
)
dWj(Γs)
for the MG case and
Y =
∫ T
t
αns
w3NΓ
N∑
i=1
(
a
µ(s)
i Ai
)
dW˜(Γs) =
N∑
j=1
∫ T
t
αns
w3NΓ
N∑
i=1
(
a
µ(s)
i Aij
)
dWj(Γs)
for the GCMG case.
Y has zero mean and, in the limit as N grows to infinity, finite variance ν (see prop.
3.1); since we consider N sufficiently large, we can assume Var[Y ] = ν. For N sufficiently
large we can apply the results obtained at the end of proof of proposition (3.1); it follows
that Y has a normal distribution with 0 mean and variance νMG =
ασ2
N
θ
w2N2
, νGCMG =
αnsσ
2
N
θ
w2N2
and equations (16) and (17) become
p(T ) = p(t) exp
{(
r − 1
2
ν
θ
)
θ −
√
ν
θ
√
θZ
}
,
Z = − Y√
ν
is a standard normal random variable.
We can apply Black&Scholes formula (see [19], pp.218-220) and obtain the price of a
call option with underlying p and strike K:
c(t, p(t);K, r, ν) = p(t)ψ(d(θ, p(t))) − e−rθKψ (d (θ, p(t))−√ν) ,
where d(θ, p(t)) =
[
log
p(t)
K
+(r+ 12
ν
θ )θ
]
√
ν
and ψ the erf function.

5 Model calibration
Calibrating the model means to find values w, α,αns , σ
2
N such that the option implied
volatility available on the market
√
νimpl equals
√
ν, where
√
ν is the implied volatility
coming from the European call option pricing formula (19). Whilst parameters α, αns
and σ2N are characteristic of the model, parameter w is related to the market liquidity of
the stock. As a consequence it is meaningful to divide the calibration in two steps. The
first step consists in finding a value w to link the stock price return volatility with the
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market volatility
√
νmkt ; the second step consists in finding, given the value of w already
calibrated, values α, αns and σ
2
N such that ν
impl = ν.
At this point it worths to define the market volatility
√
νmkt . The market volatility
is an index representing the volatility present in the market. It could be the historic
volatility of the returns of an equity index, like the S&P500 or the DAX; in this case we
should choose the time window to compute the historic volatility (1 month, 1 year,...).
The other option is to choose an index like the VIX or the VDAX; these indices, widely
used by finance practitioners as a measure of the risk present in the market, are built
starting from listed options on S&P500 or DAX and have the advantage of being uniquely
defined (no need to define a time window), more responsive to change in market regime
than the historic volatility and of having almost the same behavior of the historic ones
(maxima and minima of the short term historic volatility correspond with high degree to
the maxima and minima of the implied one). It follows that for our calibration purpose
we can use VDAX index as market volatility: what we need is just to fix values for (α, σ2N )
and (αns , σ
2
N ) respectively and find a value for ω such that
√
ν =
√
νmkt . Since the stock
price return variance is Var
[
log p(t+δt)
p(t)
]
=
σ2
N
N
1
w2N
, it reaches the minimum value when
σ2N = σ
2
c ; it follows that also the minimum of the market volatility
√
νmkt corresponds to
the critical value σc. This requires the market to be non-stationary. From the market point
of view this assumption is natural: since stationarity corresponds to the transition point
between efficiency and inefficiency it is fair to consider the market efficient or inefficient,
but not at the critical point; from the game point of view we have to require the game
parameters not to be at the critical point αc.
Taking into account the expression of the implied volatility ν, w is such that
√
ν¯mkt =
√
αc
σc
w¯N
, (19)
where
√
ν¯mkt is the minimum market volatility.
The second step consists in calibrating the MG and the GCMG on the options, that
is to find couples (α, σ2N ) and (αns , σ
2
N ) respectively such that:
√
νimpl =
√
α
σN
w¯N
for the MG and √
νimpl =
√
αns
σN
w¯N
for the GCMG, where
√
νimpl is the option implied volatility available on the market.
In order to perform the calibration on the real market we have first of all to select
a stock. We choose the DAX Index, a total return index reinvesting dividends and rep-
resenting the most relevant stocks traded at the German stocks exchange, hence a very
liquid instrument with a long time series. The calibration of w¯ is performed over VDAX
Index, which is the index of implied volatility for DAX options. The minimum volatility,
i.e. the minimum value of VDAX, since 03/01/2000 is reached the 11/02/2005 with a
value of 10.98%:
√
νmkt = 10.98%. For both the MG and the GCMG w can be obtained
from the market volatility in correspondence with the minumun value σc reached by σN ;
of course the σc of the MG is different from the one of the GCMG. The next calibration,
performed for the MG as M goes from 5 to 9 (it is not possible to calibrate for M too
small), and for the GCMG for different values of ǫ and L := PNs, is ran for all options
once.
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Figure 1: Left:
σ2
N
N
as a function of α for the MG obtained numerically for different
random histories. Right:
σ2
N
N
as a function of αns for the GCMG obtained numerically for
L := PNs = 8000, np = 1 and different values of ǫ.
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Figure 2: Left: Comparison between average calibrated α (continuos line) and average αc
(dashed line) for different values of M . Right: Comparison between average calibrated
αns (continuos line) and average α
c
ns(dashed line) for different values of L and ǫ = 0.01
(diamonds), ǫ = −0.01 (squares), ǫ = 0.1 (triangles).
We choose 18 call options, with different maturities and different moneyness, and
calibrate the games over these options minimizing the sum of squared difference of market
implied volatility and game implied volatility. Results of the calibration are displayed in
figures 3 - 8.
From the analysis of the calibration results (see figure 2) we can see that for both the
MG and the GCMG, parameters α and αns are greater than the critical points and close
to them for all the game parameters M , L and ǫ used for the simulations: this means that
the option market operates in the asymmetric phase of both the MG and the GCMG in
vicinity of the critical points.
About the quality of the calibration it is also useful to look at the ability of the game
to fit the sample of listed options: figures 3 - 8 show a good fitting at different game size
and an improvement of the quality of the calibration as M and L increase. As one would
expect a game of bigger size is able to replicate more accurately the real option market
than a smaller size game.
Last observation involves parameter w. A common feature of both games is that as
M and L increase the inverse liquidity parameter w¯ decreases: when the market efficiency
improves, and this is what happens asM and L increase since in both games the minimum
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Figure 3: Comparison between market option implied volatility (continuous line) and MG
implied volatility (dashed line). Horizontal axis displays option time to maturity, vertical
axis volatility level for options with moneyness equal to 1.06 (diamonds), 1 (squares), 0.94
(triangles). Left: M = 6, right: M = 9.
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Figure 4: Comparison between market option implied volatility (continuous line) and MG
implied volatility (dashed line). Horizontal axis displays option time to maturity, vertical
axis volatility level for options with moneyness equal to 1.1 (diamonds), 0.98 (squares),
0.88 (triangles). Left: M = 6, right: M = 9.
of σ2N decreases, each agent decreases the weight of its buy or sell decision: players acting
in less efficient markets characterized by scarce liquidity are required to increase the weight
of the bets, like it happens in real market. Whilst the behavior of w as inverse liquidity
parameter is coherent with what happens in real markets, the very low values of the
calibrated w deserve further investigations. Looking at the expression of w coming from
the implied volatility formula (19) and keeping in mind that the diffusion term of equations
(3) and (5) is linked to the characteristic time of the game dynamics (in our case the
rescaled continuous time is τ = t
P
), we can conclude that a different time rescaling has the
effect of increasing the level of w obtained from calibration. Using a rescaled time τ = t
N
,
w would increase of a factor 1√
αc
. A game without time rescaling (τ = t) would increase
the value of calibrated w of a factor
√
N , obtaining values of w greater than 1 and more
stable as M and L increase (see figure 9).
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Figure 5: Comparison between market option implied volatility (continuous line) and
GCMG implied volatility (dashed line). Horizontal axis displays option time to matu-
rity, vertical axis volatility level for options with moneyness equal to 1.06 (diamonds), 1
(squares), 0.94 (triangles). Left: L = 1000, ǫ = 0.01, right: L = 10000, ǫ = 0.01.
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Figure 6: Comparison between market option implied volatility (continuous line) and
GCMG implied volatility (dashed line). Horizontal axis displays option time to maturity,
vertical axis volatility level for options with moneyness equal to 1.1 (diamonds), 0.98
(squares), 0.88 (triangles). Left: L = 1000, ǫ = 0.01, right: L = 10000, ǫ = 0.01.
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Figure 7: Comparison between market option implied volatility (continuous line) and
GCMG implied volatility (dashed line). Horizontal axis displays option time to matu-
rity, vertical axis volatility level for options with moneyness equal to 1.06 (diamonds), 1
(squares), 0.94 (triangles). Left: L = 1000, ǫ = −0.01, right: L = 10000, ǫ = −0.01.
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Figure 8: Comparison between market option implied volatility (continuous line) and
GCMG implied volatility (dashed line). Horizontal axis displays option time to maturity,
vertical axis volatility level for options with moneyness equal to 1.1 (diamonds), 0.98
(squares), 0.88 (triangles). Left: L = 1000, ǫ = −0.01, right: L = 10000, ǫ = −0.01.
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Figure 9: Left: on left axis calibrated w for MG (continuous line), on the right axis
calibrated w without time rescaling for MG (dotted line). Right: on left axis calibrated
w for GCMG (continuous line), on the right axis calibrated w without time rescaling for
MG (dotted line); from top to bottom ǫ = 0.01, ǫ = −0.01, ǫ = 0.1.
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